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Abstract 
Betting markets provide an ideal environment in which to examine monopoly power due to 
the availability of detailed information on product pricing.  In this paper we argue that the 
pricing strategies of companies in the UK betting industry are likely to be an important 
source of monopoly rents, particularly in the market for forecast bets.  Pricing in these 
markets are shown to be explicitly coordinated.  Further, price information is asymmetrically 
biased in favor of producers.  We find evidence, based on UK data, that pricing of CSF bets 
is characterized by a significantly higher markup than pricing of single bets.  Although this 
differential can in part be explained by the preferences of bettors, it is reasonable to attribute 
a significant part of the differential as being due to monopoly power. 
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Monopoly Rents and Price Fixing in Betting Markets* 
I. Introduction 
In 1998, the UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) produced a detailed report on 
the structure of the UK betting industry in thelight of the bid by Ladbrokes, the largest chain 
of bookmakers in the UK, to take over Coral, the third largest chain (MMC, 1998).  The 
MMC argued that the take-over would have adverse competitive effects and recommended 
that Ladbrokes be forced to dispose of the Coral shops.  In this paper we argue that, although 
market structure may be important, the pricing strategies of the betting industry are also a 
significant source of monopoly rents.  In particular, we investigate the hypothesis that the 
bookmaking industry acts in such a way as to exact monopoly rent from consumers of a 
specific, popular bet, namely the Computer Straight Forecast. 
In Section Two of the paper, the structure of the betting industry in the UK is 
outlined.  In Section Three, price setting behavior for various bets is discussed.  In Section 
Four, we propose formal tests for the presence of monopoly power and present results based 
on UK betting data.  Some concluding remarks are made in Section Five. 
 
II. The UK Betting Market 
The UK racetrack betting market consists of three distinct sectors: off-course betting at 
licensed outlets (the dominant venue for betting), on-course betting, and betting by telephone 
(through deposit or credit accounts, or via debit cards).  There is also an emerging market for 
betting via the internet.  Of overall betting turnover, on-course (of approximately £700 
million) and telephone betting (about £500 million) can be compared with total betting 
turnover of over £7,000 million.  Each of these forms of betting can be sub-divided into 
fixed-odds betting with bookmakers, and pool (parimutuel) betting with the Horserace 
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Totalisator Board (the Tote).  In pool betting, winning bettors share the pool of all winning 
bets, net of fixed deductions.  Within the off-course market, pool betting plays a fairly 
insignificant role.  Current estimates of the proportion of bets placed at Tote odds in the 
outlets of the two leading bookmakers range between 1.5 and 2 per cent. 
About two thirds of all horserace betting office turnover is at Starting Prices (SPs).  
The SP is what independent assessors at the racetrack determine to be the ‘generally 
available’ price at which on-course bookmakers are willing to lay a ‘sizeable’ bet at the start 
of a race.  In addition, bets may be placed at ‘board prices’, i.e. prices posted (and which may 
fluctuate) during the ten minutes or so before the start of a race.  Board prices and SPs are 
relayed by representatives of SIS (Satellite Information Services) to betting offices as 
representative of what is available at the track.  For some races, bookmakers offer their own 
set of ‘early prices’ in the hours before the race. 
In addition to straight win bets, there are a wide range of other bets available, notably 
‘each way’ bets, allowing the bettor to nominate a horse (or greyhound) either to win or to be 
placed (usually in the first three), multiple bets on cumulative outcomes and forecast bets 
such as the Computer Straight Forecast and Tricast, which involve nomination of the first 
two or three past the post in the correct order.  A study of betting shops by Filby and Harvey 
(1988) indicated that over 20% of all bets in the UK were forecasts. 
The off-course fixed odds market is dominated by the large bookmaking chains, 
namely Ladbrokes, William Hill and Coral.  This ‘Big 3’ accounts for about 60 per cent of 
turnover in off-course licensed betting offices, whereas a ‘Big 4’, which includes Tote Credit, 
makes up 90 per cent of the telephone betting market.  Thus, market power is heavily 
concentrated on the supply side, both in terms of market structure and information.  Bruce 
and Johnson (1996) see this imbalance of power as translating into an inability by 
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“...demand-side agents to engage in effective negotiation over price” (p.8), and that 
bookmakers exploit this “control over the profile of odds and promotional material to which 
bettors are exposed...to influence betting activity into odds zones which profit the 
bookmakers at the bettors’ expense.” (p.20) 
 
III. Price Setting in Off-course Betting Markets  
Each on-course bookmaker has the right to set prices about which bets may be placed on 
different outcomes.  These prices are usually reported in the form of odds.  Odds of 5 to 1 
laid against an outcome, for example, imply a return to a successful bet of five times the 
initial stake, plus the stake returned.  An unsuccessful bet loses the entire stake.  Odds made 
available by each bookmaker are normally single bets to win or each way bets.  The large off-
course bookmakers have the power to intervene in the on-course market so as to manipulate 
(legally) the on-course prices, and most importantly the Starting Price.  However, the MMC 
found “no substantiated evidence that [this practice] was being abused.” (p.17) 
The most important form of price competition is on the terms of betting rather than 
the prices themselves.  For example, “offering a percentage addition to winnings on certain 
categories of bet; offering to pay out on both results in a horse race in the event that a result 
is changed following a Stewards Enquiry; offering to pay on the SP if a punter takes an early 
price but the SP turns out to be better; and various permutations on the theme of ‘tax-free’ or 
‘tax-reduced’ betting.” (MMC, p. 26).  Nevertheless, the MMC found that such options were 
“...limited in both availability and appeal.” (MMC, p.27) 
An important issue in the setting of on-course prices arises if some consumers possess 
superior information to the bookmakers.  The implications of such ‘inside information’ in 
betting markets are well documented in the literature (see, for example, Shin, 1993; Vaughan 
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Williams and Paton, 1997).  Specifically, the equilibrium odds will reflect a premium in favor 
of the bookmakers, designed to protect against the potential informational advantages of a 
subset of bettors.  However, there is no clear reason to attribute the consequent resource 
redistribution and misallocation to monopolistic behavior by bookmakers. 
The situation in the market for forecast bets is somewhat more complex.  Firstly, 
these bets are usually restricted to the off-course betting market.  Secondly, prices for these 
bets are derived from the prices of single bets.  For example, the payout to the Computer 
Straight Forecast (CSF), in which bettors are required to nominate the first two home in the 
correct order, is calculated using a nationally applied computerized formula which includes 
SPs as one component.  The likelihood of insider information being exploited in this market 
is extremely low for several reasons.  In the first place the CSF payouts are derived from the 
SPs and are uncertain at the time of placing a bet.  Win bets, however, can be placed at a 
certain price at any point in the market.  It is also well established that the SPs of winners are, 
on average, shorter than at any other point during the course of the market (Crafts, 1985, 
1994).  This makes it highly unlikely that insiders would find it more profitable to place a 
CSF bet with an uncertain return rather than to take a price on a win bet at some stage in the 
market.  A further feature of the UK market which makes insider trading in the CSF market 
even less likely is that CSF bets, which can only be placed off-course, are normally subject to 
a deduction of 9 per cent, whereas SP bets can be placed tax-free on-course. 
As with win bets at SP, all off-course bookmakers pay out the same odds for a given 
successful CSF bet.  The difference from single bets is that there is no competitive process in 
arriving at these odds.  Although bookmakers are at liberty to set odds on forecast bets, in 
practice the payout is almost always determined in accordance with the national formula, 
which is determined and circulated by the industry.  In other words, bookmakers in the UK 
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explicitly co-ordinate the prices of CSF bets.  The potential implications of this pricing 
strategy are clear.  Even if the prices for single bets are close to competitive prices, the 
industry may build an extra markup into its derivative pricing formula for CSFs. 
Thus, there is prima facie evidence of price fixing in the setting of odds.  Despite this, 
it is possible that the presence of close substitutes to CSF bets may provide effective 
competition and so limit the markup that can be achieved in practice.  There are likely to be 
two sources of competition. The first is the single (win and place) bets offered by 
bookmakers.  A second, and perhaps closer, substitute is the Dual Forecast (DF) offered by 
the Tote which requires consumers to select the first two horses past the post.  However, 
unlike the CSF, the DF does not require the correct finishing order to be specified.  Thus, it is 
difficult for consumers to compare returns directly.  Further, the DF is promoted in far fewer 
off-course outlets than the CSF.  The MMC Report suggests that a significant degree of 
product differentiation exists between various types of bet, with many consumers displaying 
considerable loyalty to their favored product.  There is also one other aspect of the 
bookmakers' pricing strategy in the UK that reduces the ability of substitute products to 
provide effective competition for CSF bets.  The pricing formula used to calculate the CSF 
returns is not publicized and is difficult to obtain, although technically it is not withheld.  
Further, unlike win bets and the Tote Dual Forecast, the likely payout to each CSF 
combination is not made available to consumers during the course of betting.  Indeed, the 
only information to which consumers have ready access is the actual CSF payout to the 
winning selection.  In other words, when consumers purchase CSF bets, all price information 
is effectively withheld from them ex-ante whilst all price information except that on the 
winning product is withheld ex-post.  Consequently, it is extremely difficult to compare 
prices across the different types of bet.  It would still be possible (though not without cost) 
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for consumers to estimate the expected price of a CSF bet by using historic data on winning 
payouts.  However, suppliers hinder even this by changing the pricing formula every so 
often.  This is not to say that CSF returns might not be lower than other comparable bets, for 
reasons such as consumer preferences for risky or skewed rewards.  Indeed, even where, as in 
defined US betting arenas, such formulae are widely available, the expected return can still 
be relatively poor.  Rather, the non-disclosure of the formula in the UK should be regarded as 
a potential contributory factor in the process.   
In summary, the market for CSF bets exhibits key features that distinguish it from that 
for single bets.  Firstly, the prices of CSF bets are fixed explicitly by an organized group of 
producers.  Further, there exists a significant degree of product differentiation between 
various types of bets that may inhibit effective competition from different market sectors.  
This feature is reinforced by the fact that price information is asymmetrically weighted 
against consumers.  In these circumstances, we hypothesize that producers will be more able 
to exact monopoly rent from consumer of CSF bets than from consumers of single bets.  It is 
to tests of this hypothesis that we now turn. 
 
IV. Tests of Monopoly Rents 
1. Methodology 
The empirical identification of monopoly rents is notoriously complex.  Both rates of return 
above an estimated ‘normal’ level and price cost margins have been used as measures of 
monopoly power.  However, it is difficult to disentangle the monopoly power component of 
such measures from other factors such as rents to more efficient firms or risk premia.  
Further, the question of what constitutes the ‘normal’ rate of return is itself not easy to 
answer (see Martin, 1993, pp. 486-98 for an overview of these debates). 
Fortunately, the case we are looking at provides us with a ready solution to many of 
these problems.  As the cost conditions and market structure are identical for both off-course 
win bets and CSF bets, any differential markup between the implicit price of win bets and 
CSF bets can be attributed to the presence of monopoly power.  Since SPs may also contain 
some element of monopoly pricing, arising, for example, from the operation of off-course 
bookmakers in the on-course market, this differential markup may well underestimate the 
total extent of monopoly rents.  However, it will provide us with an estimate of the monopoly 
power associated with the CSF pricing strategies as opposed to that associated with the 
market structure of the industry. 
Our measure of monopoly rents is the price cost margin or Lerner Index of monopoly 
power.  Although this is commonly used in studies of market power, the difficulty of 
obtaining detailed price and/or marginal cost data means that most authors are forced to 
approximate its value using some measure of profitability.  This problem is not present in the 
case in question.  Firstly, the price of a bet is equivalent to the implied probability of the 
payout or odds to a winning bet.  In general if the payout to a winning outcome is R, the 
implied probability (or price) of a bet on that outcome, P, is equal to 1/R.  As the win odds 
are published for every horse in a race, the price of all single fixed odds bets can be easily 
calculated.  For CSF bets, the limited information provided by suppliers means that it is only 
for the winning combination that prices can be calculated.  Secondly, as cost conditions are 
equivalent in the markets for CSF and off-course single bets, marginal cost data is not 
necessary to calculate the differential markup. 
The methodology is to calculate the price of the winning CSF bet which is implied by 
the SPs and to compare this with the actual price of the CSF bet.  Formally, denote the actual 
price by Pc and the price implied by the SPs as Ps, the differential markup, Md, is : 
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P
)m - P( - )m - P( = M
c
cscc
d      (1) 
where mc is marginal cost.  This reduces to: 
The test of the hypothesis that producers extract greater monopoly rents from CSF bets is of 
the null that Md = 0 against the alternative that Md > 0. 
P
)P - P( = M
c
sc
d       (2) 
Pc is given directly by 1/CSF where CSF is the winning payout including the original 
stake.  Ps can be calculated as the product of two elements: the objective probability of horse 
A winning and horse B coming second (πAB) and one plus the markup in this probability 
implied by the win odds prices.  The latter can be estimated by the bookmakers’ ‘overround’ 
(or excess of the probabilities implied by the SPs of all horses in a race over unity).  Noting 
that SPs are reported excluding the original stake, the probability which the SP of horse i 
implies (π'i) is equal to 1/(SPi + 1).  The overround for race j is calculated as  
where n is the number of horses in the race. 
1−′Σπ in
=1i
j   = RO
The calculation of πAB is somewhat more difficult.  One approach is to use variants of 
a formula first suggested by Harville (1973).  Harville argued that the probability of the two 
horses coming first and second can be given by: 
π
πππ
A
BA
AB  - 1
  =        (3) 
where πA and πB are the objective probabilities that horse A and B win 
respectively. 
One problem with this formula is that, in cases when the reward for being placed is 
insignificant relative to that for winning, some horses may tend either to win or finish outside 
of the money (see Hausch, Ziemba and Rubinstein, 1981).  In these cases, the Harville 
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formula, which assumes running times are independently and exponentially distributed, and 
inversely related to the probability of winning, will produce an over-estimate of the 
probability that a horse will finish second or third for favorites and an underestimate for 
longshots (see Hausch, Lo and Ziemba, 1994).  Consequently both Henery (1981) and Stern 
(1990) propose modifications to the formula which Lo, Bacon-Shone and Busche (1995) 
show can be approximated as follows: 
π
πππ
λ
λ
i
n
Ai
B
A
*
AB
 
 = 
Σ≠
      (4) 
where λ is a depreciation factor between 0 and 1.  Lo et al. suggest a range of possible values 
of λ from 1 (which corresponds to the Harville formula) to 0.76.  Although we calculate our 
estimates using both extremes, we find that, in practice, the value of λ makes no difference to 
our conclusions and for expositional ease, we report results based only on λ = 0.88, the mid-
point suggested by Lo et al. 
Estimation of these types of formulae depends on knowing the objective win 
probabilities of each horse.  These might be estimated by normalising the probabilities 
implied by the starting prices so that they sum to unity in any race.  It is a well-known result, 
however, that this will tend to underestimate the true probabilities of favorites and 
overestimate them for longshots (for discussions of this ‘favorite-longshot’ bias see Sauer, 
1998; Vaughan Williams, 1999).  Consequently, we propose a two-stage procedure to allow 
for this bias.  In the first stage, we run a probit model on an indicator variable (winij) which is 
equal to 1 if horse i wins race j and 0 otherwise.  In the second stage, we use the predicted 
probabilities from this model and normalize them so that they sum to unity for each race.  
The normalized predicted probabilities are then used as proxies for the objective probabilities 
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in equation (4) above.  Ps is now calculated as: 
)RO + .(1 = P j*ABs π       (5) 
An alternative specification is to use the individual markup implied by one or other of the 
first two places instead of the OR.  As the markup tends to be lower for horses which have 
greater probability of winning (as implied in the odds), equation (5) will tend to overestimate 
Ps and underestimate the differential markup, Md.  Thus, the estimates below should be seen 
as a lower bound on the impact of any differential monopoly power in the CSF market. 
 
2. Data 
Our sample is 1080 horse races taken from the first half of the 1996 UK flat racing season.  
Starting Prices and other race data were supplied by from Racedata Modeling Ltd.  CSF, Tote 
Win Pool and Tote DF pool winning payouts are taken from the Raceform Flat Annual for 
1997.  To allow for comparisons across the different bets, we only consider off-course bets 
where a betting ‘tax’ of 9% is payable.  As CSF payouts are reported net of tax, this requires 
some adjustment to the reported payouts.  For ease of comparison, we calculate all returns 
based on a £1.09 bet.  In other words, a £1 stake plus ‘tax’ of nine pence.  A further 
adjustment needs to be made as CSF and Tote returns are published including the original 
stake, whilst SPs are published net of the stake. 
 
3. Results 
As noted above, CSF payouts are only available for the winning outcome.  Hence, it is 
impossible to compare the mean value of the overround for SP and CSF bets.  However, in 
both cases it is possible to calculate the mean return that a consumer who places a unit bet on 
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each possible outcome can expect to get.  This is reported in Table 1.  The mean return to 
CSF bets is -0.551, whereas it is -0.381 for SP bets.  For comparison purposes we also report 
the equivalent figure for Tote Win Pool bets and Tote DF bets.  Simple t-tests confirm that 
the mean return to CSF bets is significantly lower than that to each of the other types of bet1.  
This is indicative of greater monopoly rents from CSF bets.  However, if the book for any 
race is not balanced, the actual rents gained by suppliers will be dependent on the relative 
amount of money bet on each outcome.  We can get around this problem by comparing the 
differential price cost margin for equivalent outcomes using the approach described above. 
The first step is to estimate the probit model on the indicator variable, winij.  The 
model we estimate is: 
u + n).(. + )(. +  = win ijji2i10ij παπαα ′′ lnln    (6) 
where nj is the number of horses running in race j and πi is the probability implied by the SP 
of each horse, normalized to sum to unity for each race. 
The logarithmic form for the probabilities is used as this leads to an error term that 
satisfies assumptions of normality and homoskedasticity.  The motivation for the inclusion of 
the interaction of nj with ln(πi) comes from evidence that the bias implicit in the SPs against 
longshots is dependent on the number of runners in a race (see Shin, 1993).  Although there 
are an enormous number of other variables (e.g. form of horse, jockey, trainer) that might 
affect the probability of winning, they are generally publicly available and, as such, the 
information they contain is likely to be incorporated into the bookmakers' odds.  This is 
confirmed statistically as none of a wide range of possible variables improve the explanatory 
power of our model (full details are available from the author on request).  The estimates of 
equation (6) on all horses running in the 1080 races are as follows: 
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winij = 0.423** +  0.773** ln(π'i) - 0.0043** ln(π'i).nj 
(0.057) (0.038)  (0.001) 
Log Likelihood = -3032.18; standard errors (in brackets) are adjusted to allow for dependence within races; ** 
indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
First, we confirm that the predicted probabilities from this equation and normalized as 
described above do not display the standard favorite-longshot bias.  We group the 11,351 
horses according to the predicted probabilities, and then calculate the objective probabilities 
of winning as given by the win frequency for each group.  The null hypothesis of no bias is 
equivalent to the null hypothesis that the constant term is zero in a regression of the predicted 
on the objective probabilities (see Busche and Hall, 1988, pp. 609-11).  Our predicted 
probabilities fit the objective probabilities extremely well.  For example, using 30 equal sized 
groups of horses we obtain an R2 of 0.9843.  Our constant term is 0.0011 (standard error = 
0.0032) which is not significantly different to zero at all conventional levels.  Using different 
groupings of horses makes no different to our conclusion that the predicted probabilities 
estimated by equation (6) are unbiased.  
We take the predicted probabilities of winning and calculate Ps for each race using 
equation (5).  We then calculate the differential markup of CSF bets using equation (2).  The 
results are reported in Table 2.  The first column gives the mean price of CSF bets as implied 
by the SPs, whilst column 2 gives the actual price.  The mean differential markup (Md) is 
reported in column 3.  The mean differential markup is 14.3% for CSF bets, a figure that is 
significantly greater than zero at all conventional levels. 
 
 
 13 
4. Alternative Explanations 
Although this is indicative of differential monopoly rents, we cannot exclude other 
explanations for the higher markup.  One plausible alternative explanation arises from the 
fact that CSF bets are characterized by a relatively low probability of winning and a 
relatively large winning payout compared to the relevant SP bets.  The differential markup 
may reflect a preference amongst bettors for either variance or skewness.  For example, Ali 
(1977) and Quandt (1986) identify bettors as displaying local risk preference, as evidenced 
by the overbetting of longshots relative to favorites.  However, Bird, McCrae and Beggs 
(1987), using Australian data, and Golec and Tamarkin (1998), using US data, argue that in 
fact bettors in the US are averse to risk but display a strong preference for skew.  In either 
case, if UK bettors mirror these preferences, the higher markup may be explained by higher 
demand for CSF bets.  An initial examination of the data provides some support for these 
alternatives.  The lower part of Table 2 reports the mean prices and differential markup for 
various groups of races excluding the larger CSF payouts.  When the higher CSF payouts are 
excluded there is a gradual reduction in the value of the differential markup.  However, even 
for the lowest 10% of payouts, the differential markup (2.45%) is still significantly greater 
than zero at the 1% level. 
 More formally, we use regression analysis to test whether the significance of the 
markup is robust to the preferences of bettors.  Our basic model is that the markup in each 
race j, Mdj, is a function of the (constant) degree of monopoly power, α0, and the differential 
expected utility arising from a CSF bet and the relevant SP bets: 
Mdj = α0 + a.(EU from the CSF bets - EU from SP bets)j + μj   (7) 
where μj is a normally distributed error term. 
The expected utility (EU) for each bet is given as follows: 
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EU(CSFj) =  pcsf.v(CSFj) + (1-pcsfj).v(0)    
 (8a) 
EU(SP bets) = mean[EU(SP1j) and EU(SP2j)] 
EU(SP bets) = 0.5[(p1j.v(SP1j) + (1-p1j).v(0) +  p2j.v(SP2j) + (1-p2j).v(0)]    (8b) 
where p represent probability, v(.) is a utility function and subscripts 1 and 2 
indicate  bets on the winning and second placed horse respectively. 
In order to estimate this model, we need to impose a functional form on the utility 
function, v(.).  Golec and Tamarkin (1998) suggest using the following polynomial function 
and show that it fits existing betting data very well: 
v(R) = b0 + b1 R + b2.R2 + b3.R3 + u      (9) 
where R is the payout and u is an error term implied by the truncation of  the 
polynomial. 
This is an extremely general functional form and allows for different preferences for return 
(R), risk (R2) and skewness (R3).  Using this form, the expected utility of a CSF bet becomes: 
EU(CSFj) = pcsfj.(b0 + b1.CSFj + b2.CSFj2 + b3.CSFj3 + uj) + (1-pcsfj).b0 
or 
EU(CSFj) = pcsf.(b1 CSFj + b2.CSFj2 + b3.CSFj3 + uj) + b0   (10) 
The expected utility for SP bets on the winning and second placed horse are defined similarly 
with errors, vj and wj. 
Equation (7) above now becomes: 
Mdj = α0 + a.{pcsfj.(b1.CSFj + b2.CSFj2 + b3.CSFj3 + uj) + b0 - 0.5.[p1j.(b1.SP1j 
+ b2.SP1j2 + b3.SP1j3 + vj) + b0 + p1j.(b1.SP2j + b2.SP2j2 + b3.SP2j3 + wj) + 
b0]}+μj 
which reduces to: 
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Mdj = α0 + α1.X1j + α 2.X2j  + α3.X3j + εj    (11) 
where X1 = pcsfj.CSFj +  p1j.SP1j + p2j.SP2j 
X2 = pcsfj.CSFj2 +  p1j.SP1j2 + p2j.SP2j2 
and  X3 = pcsfj.CSFj3 +  p1j.SP1j3 + p2j.SP2j3 
and εj = pcsfj.uj +  p1j.vj + p2j.wj + μj 
 
As the error term, εi, in equation (11) will be heteroskedastic with respect to the relative 
probabilities, we report robust standard errors.  A further issue is the appropriate values of 
pcsf, p1 and p2 to use in the expectations.  As we are interested in the subjective probabilities 
of bettors, we use the values implicit in the respective win odds, adjusted for overround.  
OLS estimation of equation (11) gives the following result: 
Mdj  = 5.05**  - 12.07** X1j + 0.35**.X2j + 3.32 e-4**.X3j  
  (0.834) (3.26)  (0.014) (2.50e-5)  
R2 = 0.266; standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in brackets; ** indicates significance at the 1% level.  
 
The constant term is positive and strongly significant.  Its value suggests that there is 
a residual average markup of just over 5% that cannot be explained by preferences of bettors 
for the low-probability high-payout CSF bets.  Reassuringly, a link test (see Pregibon, 1980) 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the functional form is correctly specified.  As the 
truncation of the polynomial in equation (9) to the third power of R is somewhat arbitrary 
(see Golec and Tamarkin, 1998, p.210), we test the sensitivity of the estimate to the inclusion 
of higher powers of R.  Inclusion of the fourth and fifth powers of R in equation (9) lead to 
very similar estimates of monopoly power of 10.07% and 5.72% respectively.  
An alternative measure of the probabilities in the expected utility functions would be 
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to use those predicted from equation (6) above.  Although these values are estimated and 
would introduce a measurement error problem into equation (11), the high value of the R2 in 
the regressions of predicted probabilities on winning frequencies is suggestive that the 
problem may not be too serious.  Using this method gives a much higher estimate of 
monopoly power of 10.3%.  We explore the issue of measurement error by using errors-in-
variables regression.  Experiments with reliability levels as low as 90% for variables 
individually and jointly, lead to a range of estimates for the constant term from 10.7% down 
to 5.4%, the latter figure being very close to our earlier estimate.  In every case the estimates 
are significantly greater than zero. 
A higher markup in the CSF than SP bets may, in principle, reflect an efficient market 
response to the activity of bettors with inside information.  However, as argued in Section 3, 
the institutional features of the UK market, such as the ability to take a price, and tax 
considerations, make it highly unlikely that such bettors will find it optimal, in the UK at 
least, to exploit their information through the CSF. 
In summary, we find that the price of CSF bets involves an extra markup of at least 
around 5% over the markup involved in win bets, even allowing for the impact of consumer 
preferences on the different bet types.  The institutional characteristics of this market strongly 
suggest that this aspect of the total differential, at least, can be attributed to monopoly power 
in the market. 
  
V. Policy Implications 
The UK betting industry exhibits a high degree of market concentration and the 
consequences of this have recently been examined by the MMC.  This paper has argued that 
the market for forecast bets exhibits additional characteristics that can be associated with the 
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extraction of monopoly rents from consumers.  Prices are coordinated perfectly across the 
whole industry, the product is highly differentiated and information to consumers is 
restricted.  The empirical evidence presented in this paper strongly supports the hypothesis 
that bookmakers extract significantly greater monopoly rents from CSF bets than from other 
bets.  The mean return to a unit bet on each CSF combination is significantly lower than 
those to fixed odds win bets or the Tote Dual Forecast.  Further, the price markup implied by 
CSF payouts to winning selections is significantly higher than that implied in the SPs.  
Although part of this difference can be attributed to the preferences of consumers, there 
remains a significant residual markup for which the most likely explanation is monopoly 
power. 
Our findings have several policy implications.  Given that the monopoly power is 
likely to be the result, at least in part, of the restricted information available to consumers, 
one suggestion is that bookmakers should be forced to publicize the pricing formulae by 
which forecast payouts are calculated.  Further, they might also be required to display the 
expected return to each CSF selection in the same way as the Dual Forecast displays that are 
provided by the Tote.  Although the industry is likely to strongly resist such proposals, the 
evidence presented in this paper suggests that they would have a significant impact on this 
clear case of resource misallocation.  As Dowie, Coton and Miers (1991) state, “Neither the 
argument that [the formulae] are too complicated to understand, nor the argument that they 
are business secrets, are acceptable in the light of the consumer’s right to know the terms on 
which he is transacting.” (p.440) 
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Table 1: Mean Returns to Off-course Bets 
 
 
 
 SP 
 
 Tote Pool 
 
 DF Pool 
 
 CSF 
 
Number of Possible Bets 
 
 11,362 
 
 11,362 
 
 57,358 
 
114,716 
 
Mean Return 
 
-0.381 
 
-0.369 
 
-0.309 
 
-0.551 
 
Notes: 
a. Mean return is calculated to a 1.09 off-course bet (£1 stake plus £0.09 tax) on each possible horse or combination of 
horses. 
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Table 2: Differential Markup for CSF Bets 
  
 Ps 
 
 Pc 
 
 Md 
 
  
 (CSF Price 
Implied by SP) 
(Actual 
CSF Price) 
Differential 
Markup (%) 
Number 
of Races 
All Races  5.630 
(0.215) 
 5.956 
(0.215) 
 14.29** 
(0.589) 
1080 
Lowest 90% CSF 
Payouts 
 6.220 
(0.231) 
 6.556 
(0.231) 
 10.71** 
(0.518) 
 972 
Lowest 75% CSF 
Payouts 
 7.293 
(0.261) 
 7.642 
(0.261) 
  7.61** 
(0.505) 
 810 
Lowest 50% CSF 
Payouts 
 9.923 
(0.339) 
10.301 
(0.338)  
  4.89** 
(0.490) 
 540 
Lowest 25% CSF 
Payouts 
15.175 
(0.499) 
15.642 
(0.490) 
 3.49** 
(0.624) 
 270 
Lowest 10% CSF 
Payouts 
22.965 
(0.560) 
23.357 
(0.728) 
 2.45** 
(0.931) 
 108 
 
Notes: 
a. Figures in brackets are standard errors. 
b. ** indicates that the null hypothesis that Md = 0 is rejected by a matched pairs t-test at the 1% level. 
c. Prices are multiplied by a factor of 100.
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1Several authors (for example, Gabriel and Marsden, 1990, 1991; Cain, Law 
and Peel, 1997) confirm that returns to bets with bookmakers tend to be lower than 
equivalent bets with the Tote. 
 
  
